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Assault on the Judiciary: Judicial Response to
Criticism Post-Schiavo
MEGHAN K. JACOBSON*
The freedom to question and criticize the government has been a
protected right' and long-standing tradition throughout American his-
tory. Since the drafting of the Constitution over 200 years ago, judges
have anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of judi-
cial decisions. Nevertheless, public criticism of the judiciary has
reached unprecedented heights. In 1996, for example, there was a sharp
increase in both the frequency and intensity of attacks on the judiciary.
Although in the following years public criticism of the judiciary mark-
edly declined, the past two years have seen judicial criticism escalate to
an entirely new level.2 Allegations of misconduct, intimidation, threats,
and even physical violence against the judiciary have become the norm,
and yet all the while, the victims have remained virtually silent. While
the public outcry surrounding the tragic story of Terri Schiavo led to
vicious attacks on individual judges and the independence of the judici-
ary as a whole, the judiciary did not rise to its own defense. Instead,
academic scholars, individual lawyers, and the organized bar responded
to the criticism. As such, it is only natural to wonder: why did the
judges fail to respond?
The answer to that seemingly simple question is complicatedby the
multitude of factors related to the appropriateness of judicial response to
criticism. With few exceptions, it is the general consensus that ethical
guidelines, tradition, and maintaining the dignity of the judiciary
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2001, Tulane University.
I dedicate this Note to my grandma, Valeria Morrissey, who has been a constant source of strength
and inspiration throughout my life. I am eternally grateful to my parents, Stephen and Diane
Jacobson, whose love and support motivate me to strive for perfection in everything I do, and to
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1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making any law "abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances").
2. See D. Michael Guerin, Why an Independent Judiciary, 78 Wis. LAW. 5, 49-50
(explaining how recent criticism directed toward the judiciary has turned from healthy debate to
personal attacks on judges); see also Michael B. Hyman, What to Do About Heightened Intensity
of Attacks on an Independent Judiciary, 19 CBA Rac. 12 ("[O]f late, both sides of the political
aisle have notably ratcheted up the rhetoric beyond expressing simple displeasure or disagreement
with an individual opinion. Instead, Washington has taken to assailing the judiciary's authority,
discretion, and integrity.").
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encourage silence in the face of criticism, whether that criticism is
directed toward individual judges or is a generalized attack on the judici-
ary as a whole. This Note will address the wisdom of that consensus
and whether the judiciary is ethically permitted to respond to the escalat-
ing public criticism. If so, should the judiciary nevertheless remain
silent in the face of criticism, or is it in the best interest of both judges
and the American people for the judiciary to respond? Moreover, what
are the risks of responding, or failing to respond, when the separation of
powers and the independence of the judiciary - the very foundations of
our democratic government - are threatened?
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The debate over the independence of the judiciary is not new.
More than 200 years ago, our Founding Fathers engaged in heated argu-
ments, both before and after the Constitutional Convention, focusing on
the extent and nature of the judiciary's role in the newly formed govern-
ment.3 Indeed, today's outspoken critics of the judiciary find them-
selves in good company with the likes of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas
Jefferson, and the man commonly referred to as the "Father of our Con-
stitution," James Madison.4
The signers of the Declaration of Independence were all too famil-
iar with the oppressive results of unchecked political power. The King
of England established an absolute tyranny over the American colonies,
and the signers recognized the importance of creating a stable system of
justice to protect the people.5 The result was a declaration of this coun-
try's freedom and independence that embodied a "profound feeling for
due process that is part of the American soul."6
Because the Founders were wary of both kings and political majori-
ties, they were cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and
balances to ensure that a fundamental principle of this country - the rule
of law - would be safeguarded for the future.7 Accordingly, our Consti-
tution provides for a three-tiered system of government, structured so
that no branch holds limitless power.8 The judicial branch, once
3. Kathleen Blatz, The State of the Judiciary, 62 BENCH & B. MINN. 26, 27 (2005).
4. Id.
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10, 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He has obstructed the
Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers. He
has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries.").
6. Kansas and Missouri Chief Justices Address Judicial Conferences, 74 J. KAN. B. A. 9, 11
(2005) (remarks by Chief Justice Michael A. Wolff of the Missouri Supreme Court).
7. Id. at 12.
8. See generally U.S. CoNsT. arts. 1-111.
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described as the "least dangerous" branch of the government,9 holds a
special place in our tripartite system, as it is primarily responsible for
protecting basic human liberties from government encroachment. It
completes the nation's system of checks and balances' ° and serves as an
"arbiter of disputes between factions and the instruments of
government."I I
An independent judiciary 2 is vital to the accomplishment of these
tasks. To ensure this independence, Article III of the Constitution pro-
vides that federal judges shall have life tenure and not be subject to a
decrease in pay.'3 As such, the judiciary is not a mere pawn to the
executive and legislative branches but is insulated from retribution when
the majority disagrees with the law. The judges can be confident in their
ability to follow the law, regardless of the will of the people. However,
for the judicial branch to check the executive and legislative branches
and fulfill its role as protector of the people, it must have a vehicle by
which to do so. This is found in the judiciary's power of judicial review.
The concept of judicial review stems from Marbury v. Madison, the
controversial decision in which Chief Justice John Marshall first articu-
lated the concept by explaining that "the constitution controls any legis-
lative act repugnant to it . . . [and it is] the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."' 4 This novel idea - that the
courts would be the final arbiter of disputes between the other branches
of government - led to harsh criticism of Marshall by many, including
then-President Thomas Jefferson. 5 In response to his critics, Marshall,
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1962).
10. Id. ("For I agree, that 'there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers.' . . . The complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.") (citation omitted)).
11. Kansas and Missouri Chief Justices Address Judicial Conferences, supra note 6, at 12.
12. See Thomas L. Cooper, Attacks on Judicial Independence: The PBA Response, 72 PA. B.
Ass'N Q. 60, 61 (identifying three policy goals that support the ideal of an independent judiciary,
including: (i) protecting the people from "executive oppression"; (ii) "protection against violations
of basic human rights" from either uncurbed legislative power or from a "majority opinion hostile
to minority viewpoints"; and (iii) "judges who are not influenced by bias or self-interest, and are
not swayed by momentary political impulses or demands" (citing Archibald Cox, The
Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 566, 567 (1996))).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I (providing that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office").
14. 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide the
operation of each .... This is the very essence of judicial duty.")
15. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 53 (1993) (citing 10 THOMAS
JEFFERSON, THE WRrrINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899)). Jefferson
writes of Marshall's opinion in Marbury:
[T]he Constitution has given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone the
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unlike the typical modem judge, chose to respond publicly, albeit anony-
mously. Marshall denounced his critics and supported his view of the
proper role of the Supreme Court by writing to the editor of a local
newspaper under the penname of "A Friend of the Constitution."' 6 Mar-
shall's critics eventually gave way, and judicial review continues to be
the foundation on which our legal system rests.
The present rule of law deriving from Marbury, though not infalli-
ble, allows American citizens to rely upon the justice system with a sub-
stantial amount of certainty and encourages the resolution of disputes in
a courtroom rather than on the streets. 7 When an action's legality is
questionable, few of us look to violence; instead, we turn to the courts
for a just and peaceful resolution.' 8 The judge's decision is binding, and
a litigant's options are limited to judicial appeal or a plea to the legisla-
ture in an attempt to change the law. Although no judge is perfect, this
method of solving disputes has been highly successful in providing jus-
tice to American citizens. Indeed, our judicial system is highly regarded
and emulated by many other countries around the world.' 9
ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY
The judiciary has come under attack numerous times throughout
this country's history. In the 1950s, Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court and author of Brown v. Board of Education,2" was
the subject of widespread public criticism. "Impeach Earl Warren"
signs were displayed across the nation, especially in the South, compli-
ments of a private right-wing organization known as the John Birch
Society.2" Warren's critics accused him of expanding "his judicial
authority unconscionably and exponentially" and demanded that he be
impeached.22 More than one million Americans signed a petition for
right to prescribe rules for the government of the others; and to that one too which is
unelected by, and, independent of, the nation . . . . The Constitution, on this
hypothesis is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may
twist and shape into any form they please.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
16. Michael Daly Hawkins, Dining with the Dogs: Reflections on the Criticism of Judges, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1996).
17. See Scott H. Hansen, Is There a Future in Judging?, 48 ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 21 (2005).
18. Id. at 21-22.
19. Blatz, supra note 3, at 28 ("[O]ur system of checks and balances is emulated worldwide
... [and] a strong, independent judiciary is considered a necessary ingredient in the recipe for
emerging democracies.").
20. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21. Robert L. Brown, From Earl Warren to Wendell Griffen: A Study of Judicial Intimidation
and Judicial Self-Restraint, 28 U. ARK. LIrTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
22. Id. at 3.
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him to be removed from office. 23 The efforts to retaliate against Warren
for the Court's unpopular and "activist" decision, which much of society
deemed abhorrent, was seen by many as nothing but a "frontal assault on
judicial independence. 24  Of course, the impeachment efforts were
unsuccessful and Brown has now become one of the most celebrated
Supreme Court decisions in our nation's history.25
A relatively recent and particularly egregious example of hostility
toward the judiciary involved Harold Baer, Jr., a federal judge appointed
to the Southern District of New York in 1996 by then-President Bill
Clinton. Criticism of the judiciary hit an all-time high - or as some
might say, an all-time low - when Judge Baer was perceived by the
public to be "soft" on criminals. The judge's ruling to suppress evi-
dence in a federal drug case2 6 was initially criticized by local New York
politicians, including then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and then-Governor
George Pataki. 7 Public criticism of Judge Baer's ruling soon became
widespread, eventually developing into a major bipartisan issue in
Washington. Congress was in an uproar with more than 200 members in
the House of Representatives calling for Judge Baer's impeachment.28
Even the White House became involved when the New York Times
reported that White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry demanded
that Judge Baer reverse his decision or risk being forced to resign.2 9
Matters escalated even further when then-Senate Majority Leader Bob
Dole called for his impeachment.
30
Judge Baer responded to his critics in an unusual and, some would
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 3-4 ("It was retaliation, but it was also calculated intimidation designed to take the
edge off constitutional interpretation in the years to come and to stand judicial independence on its
head.").
25. See, e.g., Gina Holland, Judges' Job Security Defended, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Jan. 1,
2005, at 3 ("[Former Chief Justice] Rehnquist said that views on activism are subjective. 'Federal
Judges were severely criticized 50 years ago for their unpopular, some might say activist,
decisions in the desegregation cases, but those actions are now an admired chapter in our national
history,' he said.").
26. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated by 921 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
27. Louis H. Pollack, Criticizing Judges, 79 JUDICATURE 299, 300 (1996).
28. See Brown, supra note 21, at 7.
29. Pollack, supra note 27, at 300 ("McCurry 'put a federal judge on public notice today that
if he did not reverse a widely criticized decision throwing out drug evidence, the President might
ask for his resignation.' A day later the Whit House waffled. Jack Quinn, counsel to the
president, wrote a Republican congressman who was urging that Judge Baer be asked to resign
that 'the President supports the independence of the Federal judiciary, which is established by the
Constitution. Although comments in recent press reports may have led some to conclude
otherwise, the President believes strongly that the issues now before Judge Baer should be
resolved in the courts."').
30. Id. ("Senator Dole [insisted], '[Judge Baer] ought to be impeached instead of
reprimanded. If he doesn't resign, he ought to be impeached.'")
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say, dangerous manner - he reversed himself.3' Less than three months
after he rendered his original ruling to suppress the drug evidence, Judge
Baer vacated that ruling in an opinion that another federal judge referred
to as a "careful analysis of the additional testimony ... [written with]
clarity, scholarship, forthrightness, and dignity."32 In his second opin-
ion, Judge Baer explained that "[a]lthough I previously accepted the
defendant's version based on the videotaped confession, the additional
evidence has necessarily changed my view."33 Interestingly, the judge
seemed to apologize directly to the public for his initial opinion, stating,
unfortunately the... (dicta) in my initial decision not only obscured
the true focus of my analysis, but regretfully may have demeaned the
law-abiding men and women who make Washington Heights their
home and the vast majority of the dedicated men and women in blue
who patrol the streets of our great City.34
We may never be certain whether Judge Baer's reconsideration and
eventual reversal of his original order was merely the result of additional
evidence or instead the unfortunate byproduct of an unconstitutional
attack on the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary.
Although many commentators maintain that Judge Baer did not in fact
succumb to political pressure, it has been suggested that "the appearance
that he did defer to the will of the man who appointed him judge is
palpable and if he did so, judicial impartiality was grievously
impaired."35
Following the intense criticism aimed at Judge Baer, four judges in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reacted in an unprece-
dented manner.36 Specifically, the judges issued a joint statement con-
demning the criticism, which admonished, "[w]hen a judge is threatened
with a call for resignation or impeachment because of disagreement with
a ruling, the entire process of orderly resolution of legal disputes is
undermined."37 The political attacks, the judges insisted, "threaten to
weaken the constitutional structure of this nation."38 Former Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist also had his say in the controversy, referring to
31. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
32. Pollack, supra note 27, at 301.
33. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. at 216.
34. Id. at 217.
35. Brown, supra note 21, at 7.
36. Then Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman, one of the judges who prepared the statement, insisted
that the intensity of the criticism directed at Judge Baer merited such a drastic response. "'We
issued our statement because what happened went far beyond informed criticism.'" John Gibeaut,
Taking Aim, 82 A.B.A. J. 50, 54 (1996).
37. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
38. Don Van Natta Jr., Judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996,
at B 1 (internal quotations omitted).
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judicial independence as a "crown jewel of our system of govern-
ment."39 Rehnquist indicated that while criticism of the court is antici-
pated, the federal judiciary must remain independent if it is to function
properly.4° It was not surprising that a Supreme Court Justice and the
Second Circuit judges recognized the attack on Judge Baer for exactly
what it was - a threat to the foundation of our country's government and
an unconstitutional encroachment on judicial powers. What is surprising
is that the sources of the criticism - representatives of the remaining two
branches of government - did not see it as such.
There are numerous factors which make both federal and state judi-
ciaries easy targets for criticism and attack. Because the Framers of the
Constitution were concerned with potential attacks on the judiciary
resulting from unpopular decisions, they undertook great efforts to
shield federal judges from the political wavering of the public.4
Though granting federal judges life-tenure was intended to reduce
threats to the independence of the federal judiciary, their protected status
may in fact have invited more criticism in two distinct ways. First,
because federal judges need not fear the loss of their job as a result of an
unpopular decision, some accuse these judges of being unaccountable
and unresponsive to public opinion.42 Second, because federal judges
are appointed, some suggest they lack a constituency to defend their
actions, which may invite more frequent and more hostile criticism,43
particularly from politicians who have much to gain. 4
This reasoning does not necessarily hold true for state judges, many
of whom are elected to the bench. The election process adds a new and
highly political element into the criticism of individual judges. Unsub-
stantiated allegations are often lodged against elected judges with the
sole purpose of gaining publicity during a political campaign. Because
elected judges are not protected by a lifetime appointment, they must be
"acutely conscious of the political fall-out from their decisions."45
Moreover, both state and federal judges are often perceived as easy
39. Gibeaut, supra note 36, at 55 (internal quotations omitted).
40. See id. ("Rehnquist said, '[t]he independence of the federal judiciary is essential to its
proper functioning and must be retained."').
41. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
42. Cooper, supra note 12, at 61.
43. See Hawkins, supra note 16, at 1355 (explaining that while a politician may think twice
before criticizing a local justice of the peace, he will not hesitate before taking on a Supreme
Court Justice).
44. See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks on Judicial
Independence at the Dedication of the Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center at the University
of Florida Levin College of Law (Sept. 9, 2005), in 58 FLA. L. REv. 1 (2006) (discussing specific
instances in which politicians have verbally attacked the judiciary).
45. See Cooper, supra note 12, at 61-62 (recognizing that this realization can threaten an
elected judge's independence and impartiality).
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targets of criticism 4 6 because of the unlikelihood that they will respond.
Indeed, there is a general consensus throughout the legal community that
it is unwise, some even say unethical, for a judge to respond to his or her
critics.47 While it is true that, with few exceptions, judges typically
remain silent in the face of an attack, it is less likely that their silence is
mandated by judicial ethical guidelines than it is a result of 200 years of
tradition.48
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE JUDICIARY
In the ten years that have passed since Judge Baer was attacked
with threats and intimidation, public criticism of the judiciary has mark-
edly declined. However, with a few controversial judicial decisions
making headlines in 2005,4 9 there has been a sudden resurgence of criti-
cism directed toward both state and federal judges, along with corre-
sponding threats to judicial independence. Indeed, 2005 alone saw an
alarming increase in unjust allegations, threats,5° intimidation, 5 and
even physical violence 52 aimed at the judiciary.
One possible reason for the increasing amount of public criticism of
the judiciary is the recent advances in technology. 53  Television and
radio sound bites, e-mail, and Internet news enable messages to be trans-
mitted instantaneously to millions of individuals at one time and "in this
electronically charged reality, the phrase 'activist judge' is being used
46. Id. at 63.
47. id. (explaining that the problem of judicial criticism is exacerbated by the inability of the
judiciary to fight back).
48. See Stephan J. Fortunato, Jr., On a Judge's Duty to Speak Extrajudicially: Rethinking the
Strategy of Silence, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 679, 682-83 (1999).
49. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that New London's
exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of economic development plan satisfied the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that execution of individuals under eighteen years of age at the time
of their capital crimes is prohibited by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1161-63 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (denying Counts 6-10 of
the Schindlers' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order requiring "[Michael Schiavo] and
hospice to transport [Terri Schiavo] to hospital for medical treatment" after federal district court
had been granted jurisdiction over this specific case by federal law); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381-82 (denying Counts 1-5 of the Schindlers' Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order) (M.D. Fla. 2005).
50. See Guerin, supra note 2, at 49.
51. See, e.g., id. at 50 (explaining how some of the judges involved in the Schiavo case
endured death threats and were forced to retain security personnel to ensure their protection).
52. See Jeff Coen & David Heinzmann, Federal Judge's Family Killed, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1,
2005, at CI.
53. See Cooper, supra note 12, at 62 ("In John Marshall's time, a letter would take weeks to
travel from Virginia to Boston; today, an attack on a judge can reach every town in Pennsylvania
simultaneously and instantaneously.").
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with ever increasing frequency."54 The use of today's media to dissemi-
nate information is especially dangerous because it rarely provides a
complete and accurate picture of what happens in state and federal
courthouses. Instead, contemporary media provides the public with a
mere glimpse of what actually occurred." Consequently, the public is
often unaware of the reasoning and policy behind a judicial decision.
The source of contemporary judicial criticism also differs some-
what from criticism of the past. Whereas in years past political fringe
elements primarily were responsible for and led the attacks on the judici-
ary, contemporary criticism frequently originates from coordinate
branches of government or from highly regarded and influential political
figures as part of a deliberate political strategy.56 Most often, the source
of these attacks is the legislative branch. One such attack was launched
in 2005 against the U.S. Supreme Court and Justice Kennedy for the
Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons."
As part of their reasoning in holding that the execution of juveniles
violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment,
the Court in Roper considered the fact that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to sanction the execution of
minors.58 A few powerful members of Congress blasted the Court for
citing international law in their opinion, boldly arguing that it was suffi-
cient grounds for removing the Justices from the bench.5 9
54. Blatz, supra note 3, at 27 (explaining how "[biloggers, pundits, Web surfers, talk radio,
and cable news shows can turn perception into reality in amazingly short periods of time").
Adding to the difficulty, extensive surveys reveal three things about the public's perception of the
American justice system. First, most people know very little or nothing at all about the American
court system. Second, there is an "underlying feeling of hostility" toward the judicial system.
Finally, what most people know or think they know about the justice system comes from sound-
bites, television dramas, or sensational and atypical high-profile cases. Stephen Kelson, Judicial
Independence and the Blame Game: The Easiest Target Is a Sitting One, 15 UTAH B.J. 14, 15-16
(2002). Indeed, it seems as though "the public understands the legal profession and the role of the
judicial system less than ever before, and the mass media and the Internet are available to anyone
with an opinion, no matter how informed or uninformed that opinion may be." Kansas and
Missouri Chief Justices Address Judicial Conferences, supra note 6, at 13.
55. Kelson, supra note 54, at 16. As Judge Michael J. Wilkins noted, the press often finds it
easier to act as a critic of the court than to actually report what the court did and why. According
to Wilkins, "[a]nyone can criticize something they don't fully understand. The more noble
undertaking would be to only criticize after assuring that both the reporter, and the readers or
listeners, fully understand what actually happened, and why. Then criticize away." Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
56. Cooper, supra note 12, at 62.
57. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also John J. Flynn, "Making Law" and
"Finding Facts" - Unavoidable Duties of an Independent Judiciary, 18 UTAH B.J. 6 (2005).
58. Flynn, supra note 57, at 6.
59. Id. Professor Flynn recognized that while such "absurd claims can easily be dismissed as
the bizarre ranting of the ignorant, or cynical attempts by political fanatics to gain control of the
courts," they nevertheless resonate with many citizens. Id.
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Another example illustrative of a legislative attempt to usurp the
power of the judiciary occurred on June 23, 2005, when the chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman James Sensenbrenner,
wrote a five page letter to Chief Judge Flaum of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.6 ° In the letter, Sensenbrenner
demanded that the court reverse its decision in a recent narcotics case
based upon his belief that the prison term the criminal received was too
short.6 ' Sensenbrenner insisted on Judge Flaum's "prompt response" to
"rectify the panel's actions. 62 The letter caused such outrage that the
aid who drafted it was fired.63
THE POST-SCHIAVO CRISIS
Perhaps the most notable legislative attack on the independence of
the judiciary occurred during the remarkably public legal battle over the
life of Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman who had been living on artificial
life support since suffering a cardiac arrest in 19 9 0 .6 While the bitter
battle between Terri's husband and legal guardian, Michael Schiavo, and
Terri's parents, Mary and Bob Schindler, made its way through both the
Florida state and the U.S. federal court systems, the media provided
twenty-four hour coverage, and the American public was hooked.65
Toward the end of Terri's life, numerous court decisions sided with
Michael Schiavo and blocked the Schindlers' efforts to sustain their
daughter's life.66 With the clock finally running out, both the Florida
state legislature and U.S. Congress attempted to pass special laws
60. Barbara E. Bergman, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Law., Inaugural Remarks (Aug.




64. Martha Neil, Some Cases Are All the Rage - Literally, 91 A.B.A. J. 38, 41 (2005).
65. See generally Lily Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo
Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665 (2007).
66. E.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1161-63 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (denying Counts 6-10 of the Schindlers' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order requiring
"[Michael Schiavo] and hospice to transport [Terri Schiavo] to hospital for medical treatment"),
affd, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005),
reh'g denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005); Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381-82 (denying Counts 1-5 of the Schindlers'
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order) (M.D. Fla. 2005), affd, 403 F.3d 1223 (lth Cir.
2005), reh'g en banc denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 945 (2005);
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at * 1-2 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2005) (denying the Schindlers' emergency motion to stay the order to remove Terri
Schiavo's feeding tube); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL
34546715, at *7 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (ordering removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding
tube). Pinellas County Circuit Court Judge George W. Greer, as a result of his rulings throughout
the Schiavo case, received numerous death threats, angry e-mails, and phone calls. Julia Duin,
Judge in Schiavo Case Faces Death Threats, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005, at Al.
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intended to preserve Terri's life as appeals in the case were exhausted.67
After the higher courts declined to intervene, then-U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Majority Leader Tom Delay viciously attacked the federal
courts, referring to them as an "arrogant, out-of-control, unaccountable
judiciary" and vowed that "the time will come" for the men and women
responsible for this to "answer for their behavior. '68  Congressman
Steve King also publicly criticized the judiciary for its decisions in the
Schiavo case, making a rare threat to cut off court funding.69 Others
recommended equally drastic measures including mass impeachment
and stripping the courts of jurisdiction to hear certain matters.70
The congressmen's comments resulted in a firestorm of controversy
and fueled a debate that was already raging out of control. But the con-
troversy that ensued implicated issues that reached far beyond the fate of
Terri Schiavo. Indeed, the national debate that both preceded and fol-
lowed Terri Schiavo's death revived the 200-year-old struggle that
remains at the heart of our nation's government. The congressmen's
threats and allegations were viewed by many throughout the legal com-
munity as yet another attempt by the legislature to encroach on the
power that the Founding Fathers had reserved for the judicial branch.7'
Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct - yet related
- undesirable consequences. First, it is feared that the criticism will
prevent judges from remaining insulated from "the personal and political
consequences of making an unpopular decision," thereby placing judi-
cial independence at risk.72 Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will
erode the public's trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution,
two vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy.
67. Neil, supra note 64, at 41.
68. Mike Allen, DeLay Apologizes for Comments: Leader Wouldn't Say Whether He Wants
Schiavo Judges Impeached, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2005, at A5. A month after DeLay fired his
angry words at the judiciary, he apologized, explaining that he said something in an "inartful way"
and should not have done so. Id. Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives insisted that
they did not open, nor did they plan to open, any new investigations of federal judges, despite
DeLay's initial promise to the contrary. See Theodore B. Olson, Lay Off Our Judiciary, 30 MONT.
LAW. 26, 27 (2005).
69. Frank Williams, Killing Justice: The Judiciary Under Siege, 54 R.I. B.J. 15, 16 (2005)
("'We can do that,' King said, '[When their] budget starts to dry up - we'll get their attention.
We must get them in line.' ")
70. See O'Connor, supra note 44, at 6. Justice O'Connor described her reaction to a lawyer's
suggestion that Congress cut the Supreme Court's budget until it agrees to allow cameras and
audio equipment into all federal courtrooms: "Given the political climate, and the tenuous grip
many people have on the concept of judicial independence, when I hear a threat to cut judicial
budgets, even when it is only about cameras, I get really worried." Id.
71. Neil, supra note 64, at 41.
72. Kelson, supra note 54, at 18; see also Pollack, supra note 27, at 301 (attacks on a judge
risk inhibition of the judiciary as they endeavor to serve the public by discharging their
constitutional duties).
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Most of those who viewed the public outcry surrounding the Schi-
avo case as an attack on judicial independence were not as worried about
the threats of budget-cutting and jurisdiction-stripping as they were
about the possibility that DeLay and other outspoken critics were under-
mining both individual judges and the judicial institution as a whole.73
For the judiciary to fulfill its role in the tripartite system of government
as set out by the Founding Fathers, it must be truly independent and
composed of judges who are fair, impartial, and dedicated to applying
the law.74 There is no room for political considerations or majoritarian
beliefs in the law. As former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren
Burger so eloquently stated years ago, "[j]udges ... rule on the basis of
law, not public opinion, and they should be totally indifferent to pres-
sures of the times."75 But this basic tenet of law is unfamiliar to many
Americans,76 which makes the statements of influential political leaders
all the more dangerous and misleading.77 Aware that words such as
"accountable" and "activist" were becoming part of some citizens' eve-
ryday vernacular, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars became increas-
ingly concerned with the damage done to the public's faith and trust in
the judiciary and the "impact that eroded trust has [had] on the nature of
our democracy. '"78
Their fears were validated when a September 2005 American Bar
Association ("ABA") Survey 79 revealed that more than half of the
American public was angry and disappointed with the nation's judicial
branch.8° The survey, conducted six months after Terri Schiavo's death,
found that a majority of respondents agreed with statements that "judi-
73. Blatz, supra note 3, at 28.
74. See, e.g., James W. Riley Jr., The Judiciary Must Be Independent, 49 REs GESTAE 5
(2006).
75. Guerin, supra note 2, at 5.
76. A poll commissioned by the ABA in July 2005 indicated that forty percent of respondents
could not even identify the three branches of government. Martha Neil, ABA Activism Survey
Alarms Scholars, 31 MoNT. LAW 20, 21 (2005).
77. Robert J. Grey Jr., Stop the Verbal Assaults, 27 NAT'L L.J. 22 (2005) (explaining that the
public's confusion and misunderstanding of the proper role of the courts has been exploited by
some irresponsible political leaders with the goal of intimidating the judiciary into bending to
political whims).
78. Blatz, supra note 3, at 27. "We need to be concerned because a judiciary subservient to
other branches of government cannot uphold an individual's rights against the stiff wind of
popular will." Id.; see also Michael B. Hyman, Getting Hammered: What to Do About
Heightened Intensity of Attacks on an Independent Judiciary, 19 Cm. B. Ass'N REc. 12 (2005)
("Justice Stephen Breyer, in discussing threats to judicial independence at the ABA meeting in
Chicago, told the gathering, '[i]f you say seven or eight or nine members of the Supreme Court
feel there's a problem .. .you're right,' .... ").
79. The ABA survey was conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation, who contacted
1016 adults around the country. The margin of error was plus or minus three percentage points.
Neil, supra note 76, at 20.
80. Id.
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cial activism" has reached a crisis stage, and - perhaps most shockingly
- judges who ignore the peoples' values should be impeached. 81
The severity of the situation was reflected in the responses of those
who took a stand against the outspoken critics of the judiciary. Even
before the ABA's survey was conducted, deans from over 200 law
schools across the country, reacting to what this Note refers to as the
"post-Schiavo crisis," released a public statement condemning the harm-
ful and irresponsible attacks on the judiciary and demanding an end to
the criticism.8 2 The ABA also reacted quickly to the attacks. Six days
before Terri Schiavo's death, for example, then ABA president Robert
Grey issued a statement in defense of the judiciary. Recognizing that
the circumstances surrounding Terri Schiavo had evoked strong feelings
from all Americans, Grey argued that many people have "crossed the
line" and are now using the tragedy as an excuse to viciously attack the
men and women of the judiciary.83 Grey called on members of the legal
profession to respond to attacks on the independence of the judiciary and
the Constitution and to work to reinstate public trust and confidence in
the American justice system.84
Not everyone in the legal community views the recent criticism of
judges and the judiciary as an unjustified attack or a threat to judicial
81. Id. Moreover, nearly fifty percent of the respondents agreed with a congressman who
called judges "arrogant, out-of-control and unaccountable." Id. As one legal scholar explained,
the thought that judges should "somehow follow the voters' views really reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of what judges are supposed to do .... They should only be criticized when
they ignore the law and start infusing their own values into the law regardless of the law." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
82. Williams, supra note 69, at 15. The statement read in part: "These attacks upon judges
from properly doing their duty are profoundly misguided; if the public comes to believe that
judges will make their decisions with an eye towards being evaluated according to some political
gauge, respect for our legal system will be seriously undermined. The expectation of fairness and
the rule of law will be eroded, and the authority of the courts will diminish." Id.
83. Press Release, Statement of Robert J. Grey, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Re: Attacks on
the Judiciary in the Terri Schiavo Case (Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.abanet.org/media/
statementsletters/sttjudiciary.html. Recognizing that it is entirely appropriate for commentators,
policymakers, and the public to actively engage in debates over the issues implicated by the
Schiavo case, Grey demanded an end to the judicial attac ks. "Instead of maligning them for
applying existing law to the case at hand, even though it may not reflect the current will of
Congress, we should praise them for dispensing even-handed justice and upholding the
independence of the judiciary even under the most difficult circumstances. These judges deserve
our respect, not our scorn." Id.
84. Robert J. Grey, Jr., Lawyers Must Defend Judges, Juries, 91 A.B.A. J. 6 (2005). The new
president of the ABA, Michael S. Greco, has also taken affirmative steps in defense of the
judiciary. In response to what he characterized as an "alarming increase in rhetorical and physical
attacks on the judiciary," Greco established the Commission on Civic Education and the
Separation of Powers. Greco hopes the Commission, established in August 2005, will be effective
in educating the public about the vital role of an independent judiciary in U.S. government.
Michael S. Greco, Lawyers Have a Lot to Teach, 91 A.B.A. J. 6 (2005).
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independence, however.8 5  To the contrary, some see criticism - even
exceptionally harsh criticism - as a natural product of a thriving democ-
racy in action.86 They view public criticism as serving a vital function
as a check on the judiciary's power87 and insist that what many people
characterize as a vicious attack on the independence of the judiciary is
simply a modern day resurgence of the 200-year-old struggle between
the coequal branches of government.88
To be sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and
addressing a problem that merits public attention.8 9 Public awareness,
debate, and criticism of judicial decisions ensure that people are
informed of controversial court decisions that have broad implications
for all citizens. 9° Indeed, informed discussion and debate from lawyers,
academics, and public officials have been hallmarks of the American
legal institution9' and have played a vital role in shaping the law. Some
argue further that public criticism of the judiciary protects against
"unwise decisions" 92 and that, consequently, judges "should welcome all
criticism ... in order to help them improve the quality of their work." '93
Moreover, a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
argues that while all citizens have a right to criticize the judiciary, law-
yers, as officers of the court, have an ethical and societal obligation to
85. The words of Justice David Brewer, for example, still resonate with many in the legal
community. In 1898, he said, "[i]t is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either
honored or helped by being spoken of as being beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and
character of its justices should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments
subject to the freest criticism." Roger J. Miner, Criticizing the Courts: A Lawyer's Duty, 29
CoLo. LAW. 31, 32 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
86. John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 GREEN BAc 2d 277, 277 (1998) (arguing that such
criticism is the "natural response of the national political process to nominees with little paper
record and to a federal judiciary that - rightly or wrongly - has extended its reach into
controversial social and moral issues").
87. Molly McDonough, Hatch: 9th Circuit Is 'Poster Child of Judicial Activism,' 4 A.B.A. J.
E-REPORT 4 (2005) ("'Insisting on freedom from such criticism, or arguing that criticism
undermines some notion of judicial independence, insulates the judiciary from a potential check
on its power, and, therefore, invites it to be less careful in its decisions and less solicitous to do
exact justice."' (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch)).
88. Yoo, supra note 86, at 286.
89. Howard C. Coker, Responding to Judicial Criticism, 73 FLA. B.J. 10 (1999).
90. Riley, supra note 74, at 5.
91. Pollack, supra note 27, at 301.
92. Miner, supra note 85, at 32. As Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone once said, "I have no
patience... with the complaint that criticism of judicial action involves any lack of respect for the
courts. When the courts deal, as ours do, with the great public questions, the only protection
against unwise decisions, and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and
fearless comment upon it." Miner, supra note 85, at 32 (citation omitted).
93. Yoo, supra note 86, at 281. While judges certainly do not enjoy being criticized by the
public, they are grown adults who do not need to be shielded from reality. Yoo emphasizes that
federal judges do not need protection from criticism, as they are the only branch of our national
government that is insulated from political pressure. Id.
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do so.94
There can be no doubt that every American enjoys the fundamental
freedom to criticize the government,95 which necessarily includes the
right to criticize individual members of the judicial branch or the judici-
ary as a whole.9 6 While most people agree that the right to criticize the
judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,97 there
is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.98 To
be sure, the type of criticism leveled at the judiciary following the death
of Terri Schiavo has crossed the line to become nothing but personal
attacks and intimidation.99 This criticism, it is feared, will soon prevent
judges from remaining insulated from the personal and political conse-
quences of making unpopular decisions.'
Given the potentially devastating effects that such attacks and
unjust criticism can have, i.e., threatening the independence of the judi-
ciary and undermining the public's confidence in the judicial system, the
question then becomes, what, if anything, should be done about it?
94. Miner, supra note 85, at 31 (arguing that the Preamble to the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct's statement that "it is a lawyer's duty . . . to challenge the rectitude of
official action" imposes an affirmative duty on every member of the bar to criticize the courts
(internal quotations omitted)); see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 4 (1997).
95. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145-46 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that "the only constitutional way our Government can preserve itself is to leave its people
the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize or discuss, as they see fit, all governmental policies
and to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental postulates are bad and should be
changed"); see also Joseph J. Roszkowski, ABA House Votes on Criticism of Judges, Medicaid &
More at Mid-Year Meeting, 46 R.I. B.J. 21, 21 (1998) (arguing that the right to criticize public
officials and the institutions in which they serve is a vital component of the American concept of
self-government and the resulting debate can lead to a better government).
96. Even former President Clinton has asserted his right to criticize the rulings of the federal
bench: "[While] I support the independence of the Federal judiciary[,] . . . I do not believe that
means that those of us who disagree with particular decisions should refrain from saying we
disagree with them." Alison Mitchell, Clinton Defends His Criticism of New York Judge's Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996 (internal quotations omitted).
97. Indeed, even the ABA recognizes the need to monitor courts and express dissatisfaction
with their actions in appropriate forums. These forums include voting booths, higher courts, the
media, and the legislature. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Sample Open Letter on Judicial
Independence, May 2005, http://www.abanews.org/docs/judindepopenletter.pdf.
98. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 89, at 10 ("If [criticism] is misguided, unsubstantiated,
exaggerated and unanswered, then [it] unfairly demeans and destroys a person or institution by
eroding respect, confidence and trust."); Grey, supra note 84, at 6 ("While criticizing judicial
decisions is a time-honored practice, efforts to intimidate and threaten judges are not part of that
tradition."); Guerin, supra note 2, at 50 (arguing that increasing hostility toward the courts will
threaten to undermine the independence of the judiciary).
99. Guerin, supra note 2, at 49-50; Williams, supra, note 69, at 15 (noting that when "judges
... are publicly belittled, the once bright line between heated, respectful debate and mean-spirited,
agenda-laden accusations is eroded").
100. See Kelson, supra note 54, at 18.
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JUDICIAL OPTIONS IN RESPONDING TO CRITCISM
A thorough analysis of both case law and scholarly writing reveals
three general methods that state and federal judges utilize in responding
to public criticism. First, a judge may formulate a response within court
opinions and other legal documents that he writes as part of his judicial
activities. Second, a judge may respond extrajudicially, by personally
advocating on his own behalf or by releasing a statement to the media.
Finally, a judge may remain silent in the face of an attack, leaving his
defense to others such as the organized bar.
RESPONDING WITHIN A JUDICIAL OPINION
It is rare to see a judge respond to criticism within a judicial opin-
ion or order. Perhaps this is because it is often the judge's opinion itself
that is the direct target of the criticism. Consequently, the judge is left
without a judicial vehicle in which to respond. Of course, as was the
case with Judge Baer, it is entirely possible for a judge to reconsider his
initial resolution of a specific legal issue and vacate his previous order.
Judge Baer did just that, and his second order, specifically addressed to
"those who may take the time to read this decision,"10' 1 resembled an
apologetic response to his critics in which he eventually succumbed to
their demands.
The Schiavo case presents another example of how a judge may
respond to criticism within a judicial opinion. Because the media cover-
age and public criticism surrounding Terri Schiavo was not only contin-
uous, but escalated as the case progressed through both the Florida state
and the U.S. federal court systems, the judges at every level were
acutely aware of the intense emotions of many Americans, as well as the
increasingly hostile attitude toward the judiciary. Consequently, many
of the judges were in the unique position to be able to respond to the
concerns of the general public as well as to the allegations and threats of
the individual congressmen. One such judge, Judge Birch10 2 from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, took advantage of this
opportunity to defend the judiciary against the onslaught of unjust alle-
gations and heavy criticism.
On the eve of Terri Schiavo's death, Judge Birch filed a concurring
opinion aimed at silencing the critics and correcting the public's general
misunderstanding of the courts' role in the Schiavo case. 0 3 In an opin-
101. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 214. (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. Judge Birch is a conservative judge, appointed by former President George H. W. Bush.
He was appointed in 1990 and is now a seventeen-year veteran of the U.S. Court of Appeals. See
Lincoln Caplan, This Fight's About More than Just Judgeships, WASH. POST, May 8, 2005, at B3.
103. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
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ion that read more like a high-school civics lesson than a sophisticated
legal analysis, Judge Birch specially concurred in the Eleventh Circuit's
denial of a rehearing en banc' ° of a previous decision rendered by the
District Court.'I 5 Recognizing that "the time ha[d] come for dispassion-
ate discharge of duty,"'0 6 Judge Birch articulated what many in the legal
community attempted to convey for the weeks and months leading up to
Terri Schiavo's death. In the concurring opinion, which was clearly
directed more toward the uninformed public' 07 than the multitude of
lawyers and legal scholars involved with the case, Judge Birch endeav-
ored to educate the public with a brief and elementary lesson on Ameri-
can history, explaining:
[T]he Framers established a constitutional design based on the princi-
ples of separation of powers .... [They] established three coequal
but separate branches of government, each with the ability to exercise
checks and balances on the two others. And to preserve this
dynamic, the "Constitution mandates that 'each of the three general
departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the con-
trol or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the
others.'"108
After enlightening the public on two core principles of our nation's
system of government - separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary - Judge Birch then confronted his critics' allegations head
on. Acknowledging that some members of society, including certain
members of Congress, had accused the judiciary of acting as "activist
judges," Judge Birch returned fire, pointing out that when "the legisla-
tive and executive branches of our government have acted in a manner
demonstrably at odds with our Founding Fathers' blueprint for the gov-
ernance of a free people - our Constitution[,] . . . it is the duty of the
judiciary to intervene."'0 9 Ultimately concluding that it was proper for
the appellate court to deny rehearing en banc,"° Judge Birch summed up
104. Id. at 1271.
105. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1161-63 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(denying Counts 6-10 of the Schindlers' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order requiring
"[Michael Schiavo] and hospice to transport [Terri Schiavo] to hospital for medical treatment"
after federal district court had been granted jurisdiction over this specific case by federal law).
106. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1270, 1271.
107. A judicial opinion is often addressed to multiple parties. While an opinion certainly
speaks to those who have a direct stake in the case at bar, including the parties, their lawyers, and
lower court judges, an opinion may also be directed to a broader audience such as students,
expounders, or critics of the law. John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 447, 490 (2001). Ordinarily, judicial opinions do not explicitly reference these groups;
however, a judge occasionally addresses one or more groups directly. Id.
108. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d at 1272-73 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 1271, 1276.
110. Id. at 1271. Judge Birch explained that because various provisions of An Act for the
20071
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his concurrence with an ominous yet fitting warning: "If sacrifices to the
independence of the judiciary are permitted today, precedent is estab-
lished for the constitutional transgressions of tomorrow."''
If given the opportunity, responding to criticism within a judicial
opinion can be an ideal and effective means for a judge to communicate
with his critics; it certainly was for Judge Birch. However, because
judges are often criticized based on their legal opinions themselves, it is
a rare case when a judge will either have the opportunity to respond to
criticism made prior to an opinion's publication or to be able to antici-
pate and respond to criticism before the criticism is actually made. Con-
sequently, a judge is often left with two choices when confronted with
criticism: speak out extrajudicially or remain silent.
SILENCE
With few exceptions, there is an implicit - if not explicit - assump-
tion throughout the legal community that the most appropriate way for a
judge to deal with his critics is to do nothing at all." 2 Many believe that
a judge enters the public sector with the expectation of being exposed to
public scrutiny and criticism, and it is improper, even unethical, for a
judge to speak extrajudicially in his own defense or in defense of the
judiciary as a whole." 3 The authority cited most for this proposition is
the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("Model Code").'
14
Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005), also
known as Terri's Act, were unconstitutional infringements on the principle of the separation of
powers, the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case was improper. Id. at 1275.
111. Id. at 1276 (emphasis in original) (recognizing that even when faced with a tragedy such
as that suffered by Terri Schiavo and her family, the court "must conscientiously guard the
independence of our judiciary and safeguard the Constitution").
112. See Fortunato, supra note 48, at 682-83 ("This strategy ... of non-response is widely
practiced by judges and supported by individual scholars and committees of concerned members
of the legal community who have examined the problems of attacks on the judiciary.").
113. See, e.g., Cooper supra note 12, at 63 (the problem of judicial criticism is "aggravated by
the inability of the judiciary to fight back"); Fortunato, supra note 48, at 708 ("[T]he conventional
wisdom to date has counseled - and in some cases, mandated - silence."); Miner, supra note 85,
at 32 ("Even in the case of unfair and unjust criticism, the bench should remain silent).
114. The ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct originates from the 1924 ABA Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which consisted of thirty-six provisions that were intended to be a "guide and
reminder to the judiciary." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT preface 2 (2003) (citations and
internal quotations omitted). Because the canons were meant to guide the behavior of judges'
behavior as opposed to provide for disciplinary action, their usefulness was limited. See Nancy L.
Sholes, Judicial Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 379, 381-82 (1992). The
canons were superseded by the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 383-384. Although the
1972 Code was drafted to be more enforceable, it was eventually deemed insufficient to deal with
pressing societal issues. Id. Thus, in 1990, the ABA adopted a new Model Code of Judicial
Conduct ("Model Code"). Id. at 384. It has since been amended three times. Model Code of
Judicial Conduct - Center for Ethics and Professional Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mcjc/home.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007) ("The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct was
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The Model Code has been adopted at least in part by most, if not
all, of the fifty states." 5  Along with its federal analogue - the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges" 16 - the Model Code is intended to
provide basic standards to govern the conduct of judges and to provide
guidance for judges in their efforts to maintain high standards of both
judicial and personal conduct." 7
Those who believe that the proper judicial response to criticism is
no response at all find support for their contention throughout the Model
Code. In fact, two out of the five canons that comprise the Model Code
explicitly address the propriety of extrajudicial speech.
Canon 3 requires that a judge perform the duties of judicial office
impartially and diligently." 8 To that end, Canon 3B(2) mandates that a
judge remain faithful to the rule of law and not be swayed by outside
influences, including "partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criti-
cism."' 9  In order to maintain the judiciary's impartiality and indepen-
dence, Canon 3B(9) prohibits a judge from making any public comment
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the
fairness of a pending or impending proceeding. 20  In the commentary
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 7, 1990, and
amended in 1997, 1999, and 2003."). On February 12, 2007, the ABA Joint Commission to
Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct completed a three-and-a-half-year revision process,
which culminated in the adoption of the Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("Revised
Model Code"). Mark Harrison, Chairman, ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, Chair Message, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics (last visited Mar. 26,
2007). Among other changes, the Revised Model Code clarifies any ambiguities contained in the
Model Code regarding the propriety of judicial response to criticism. Although the Revised
Model Code has not yet been adopted by any of the fifty states, the Commission hopes "that the
[RIevised [Model] Code will promote national uniformity and be adopted by the highest Court in
each state." Id. Because the Model Code was the version under which the courts were operating
during the post-Schiavo crisis, however, the Model Code will be the primary subject of analysis in
this Note. A thorough analysis of the new language in the Revised Model Code and its
implications for the future, should the states choose to adopt it, will follow.
115. Brown, supra note 21, at 9.
116. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES (U.S. Courts Judicial Conference 2000),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html. The Code of Conduct for United
States Judges ("Code of Conduct") is very similar to and generally follows the provisions of the
Model Code. ABA Revises Code of Judicial Ethics, JOYCE FOUND., Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.
joycefdn.org/News/NewsDetails.aspx?Newsld=162. In fact, Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of
Conduct and the sections therein are substantively identical to those of the Model Code. These
three canons are entitled: (1) A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the
Judiciary; (2) A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All
Activities; and (3) A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the [Judicial] Office Impartially and
Diligently. Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canons 1-3 (U.S. Courts Judicial
Conference 2000), with Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 1-3 (2003).
117. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2003).
118. Id. Canon 3.
119. Id. Canon 3B(2).
120. Id. Canon 3B(9) ("A Judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any
court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair
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following Canon 3B(9), the Committee explains, using language identi-
cal to that found throughout the Model Code, that these restrictions on
judicial speech are "essential to the maintenance of the integrity, impar-
tiality, and independence of the judiciary."''
Given the importance of the public's confidence in the fairness and
independence of the judicial system, the Model Code's prohibition on
extrajudicial speech regarding a pending or impending case is unsurpris-
ing. A judge who comments on the merits of a case over which he is or
will be presiding conveys to the public a bias and partiality that conflict
with his role as a fair and neutral arbiter of disputes. Such comments by
a judge suggest that he may decide the case based on his own precon-
ceived notions or views expressed by the public, rather than making his
decision based on the law and facts of each individual case.1 22 Moreo-
ver, one judge commenting on a case pending before another judge leads
to the possibility that those comments will affect the outcome or fairness
of that case, or at the very least create the appearance that this may
happen. 123
The expansive prohibition in Canon 3B(9) casts a wide net and
could be broadly construed as forbidding a judge from commenting on
virtually any aspect of a pending or impending case. However, Canon
3B(9) also specifically identifies two categories of speech as falling
outside the canon's proscription: (i) public statements made within the
course of a judge's official duties and (ii) public statements in explana-
tion of court procedures.1 24  Again, these exceptions are somewhat
vague and open to interpretation. At least one state has interpreted the
exceptions to allow a judge to discuss a case in general and abstract
legal terms as well as provide background information regarding the
general operation of the courts. 25 Even with its two exceptions, Canon
its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or
hearing.... This Section does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of
their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court."
(emphasis supplied)). The commentary to 3(B)(9) and (10) defines a pending proceeding as "one
that has begun but not yet reached final disposition," whereas "an impending proceeding is one
that is anticipated but not yet begun." Id. Canon 3B(9)-(10) cmt.
121. Id.
122. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. n.] (2007) (explaining the distinction
between a judge and a legislator or executive branch official).
123. Cynthia Gray, When Judges Speak Up: The Code of Judicial Conduct and Public
Education, 38 JUDGES' J. 6, 8 (1999). A rule such as Canon 3B(9) "guards against the dangers
that a judge might feel pressured or appear to feel pressured by the comments of a peer and
colleague; that a jury would accord deference to or would appear to accord deference to an
opinion expressed by a judge; or that a public impression might be created that citizens are not
being treated fairly because different judges do not agree." Id.
124. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2003).
125. In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984).
[Vol. 61:931
ASSAULT ON THE JUDICIARY
3B(9) provides a clear prohibition on judicial speech - even when that
speech is in response to an unfair attack on a judge's conduct in a pend-
ing matter - so long as the response might reasonably be expected to
affect the matter's outcome or impair its fairness.
Canon 4 also explicitly references the propriety of judicial speech,
yet does so in permissive, as opposed to prohibitive, terms. Canon 4
requires a judge to conduct any extrajudicial activities so as to minimize
the risk of conflict with any judicial obligation.' 26 Because it is widely
recognized that judges can serve an important societal function by shar-
ing their valuable knowledge and experience with others to benefit the
judicial system as a whole, Canon 4B specifically permits a judge to
"speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other extrajudicial activi-
ties concerning the law, the legal system, [and] the administration of
justice."' 27 While Canon 4 encourages judges to use various methods of
communication to contribute to the improvement of the law and the
legal system in general, the rule is silent as to how a judge may or may
not respond to criticism of his individual conduct or that of the judiciary
in relation to a specific matter.
Whereas Canons 3 and 4 specifically address the propriety of extra-
judicial speech, the first two canons of the Model Code speak generally
to the obligations of every judge to uphold the integrity and indepen-
dence of the judiciary'28 and to avoid impropriety and the appearance
thereof.'29 Although these canons do not explicitly dictate whether and
to what extent a judge may respond to criticism, Canons 1 and 2 never-
theless serve as much of the basis for the belief that any response from a
judge is unethical.
Recognizing that an independent judiciary is vital to a just society,
Canon 1 requires that judges uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary. 3 ° Commentary to Canon 1 explains that deference to both
the rule of law and specific rulings of the courts depends upon public
confidence in the integrity and independence of the judiciary, which in
turn depends upon the judiciary acting without fear or favor; "[a]n inde-
pendent judiciary is one free of inappropriate outside influences.''
Some argue that this broad and expansive canon carries the implicit
assumption that a judge should refrain from responding to any criticism,
particularly that which is directed toward a judge in his individual
126. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2003).
127. Id. Canon 4B.
128. Id. Canon 1.
129. Id. Canon 2.
130. Id. Canon 1.
131. Id. Canon I cmt.
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capacity.' 3 2 First, remaining silent when faced with criticism may indi-
cate to the public that the judge is unaffected by the criticism and will
not allow it to influence the judge's future decisions. His silence dem-
onstrates an unwillingness to be swayed by public sentiment and empha-
sizes the importance of adhering to the rule of law at any cost, two vital
components in maintaining public confidence in judicial independence.
Response to criticism of individual judges - for example, defending
a particular legal decision - is also discouraged on the basis that any
response would undermine the dignity of the court. 133 This position is
summed up by the words of one legal scholar:
[J]udges ordinarily should refrain from explaining or defending their
decisions even if their critics have ignited a firestorm of hostility....
While some judges might suppose that such comments will help to
restore or maintain public confidence in the judicial system, com-
ments about individual decisions are far more likely to subtly erode
public respect.
1 34
Similarly, many believe that it is inappropriate for judges to
respond to criticism directed toward a specific decision because the rea-
soning of that decision has already been made available to the public.
3
1
Simply put, the opinion should speak for itself and any additional com-
ment by the judge is unnecessary.
In the event that the criticism is not directed toward a particular
judge but is instead directed toward the judiciary as a whole, some pro-
ponents of the "silence method" suggest a balancing test instructing a
judge to refrain from defending the court unless the defense has a higher
likelihood of preserving judicial integrity than diminishing it. 136 Under
this subjective test, responding to criticism would rarely be appropriate.
In the case of widespread dissatisfaction with the judicial system or
diminished public confidence in the court, however, it may be appropri-
ate for a judge to defend the judiciary or the judicial process in gen-
eral. "'37 Following this reasoning, the "post-Schiavo crisis" may be a
rare circumstance in which the court can and should respond to unjust
132. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 123, at 6.
133. See Response to Criticism of Judges: Model Program Outline for State, Local, and
Territorial Bar Association: Suggested Program for the Appropriate Response to Criticism of
Judges and Courts, A.B.A., July 1997, available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/lawyersconf/pdf/
responsetoscriticism.pdf.
134. William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 589, 606 (1989).
135. Id. (explaining that if an opinion is rational and reasonable, then the judge will be unable
to contribute anything of value to the debate beyond what has previously been stated in the
opinion).
136. Id. at 609-10.
137. Id.
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criticism and allegations of impropriety while still remaining within the
ethical bounds of the Model Code.
Canon 2 of the Model Code instructs that at all times, a judge must
avoid impropriety and the appearance thereof.'38 Like Canon 1, Canon
2 is also followed by commentary emphasizing the importance of public
confidence in the judiciary.' 39 The commentary goes on to explain that
"a judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny ...
and must therefore accept restrictions on the judge's conduct," such as
restrictions on judicial speech imposed by Canon 3B(9).14° Although
the Committee never says so explicitly, the implication that it is
improper for a judge to respond to "public scrutiny" could hardly be
clearer, particularly when that scrutiny relates to a pending or impending
matter.
Taken as a whole, the five canons comprising the Model Code'
do in fact place restrictions on a judge's ability to respond to criticism.
The Model Code is not nearly as restrictive as some believe, however.
Together, Canons 1 through 5 instruct a judge to refrain from comment-
ing on pending or impending cases if the outcome may be affected or its
fairness compromised, but they permit comment on non-pending or
resolved matters so long as those comments do not lead to the appear-
ance of impropriety or detract from the integrity of the court in any way.
Although the Model Code implies that responding to criticism of a
resolved matter - such as the criticism the judiciary received after Terri
Schiavo's death - may in fact detract from the court's integrity and lead
to the appearance of impropriety, nothing in the Model Code explicitly
addresses the propriety of such a response. Interpreted broadly, there-
fore, the Model Code permits individual judges to respond to genera-
lized attacks on the judiciary by informing the public of the role of an
independent judiciary in the legal system. The propriety of responding
to criticism of individual judges and their decisions, however, is argua-
ble and depends on one's individualized interpretation of the Model
Code. The issue becomes even more complicated when the criticism is
couched as a general attack on the judiciary but is in fact a direct assault
on one particular judge. In this situation, the Model Code provides little
guidance, and it can be very difficult for a judge to determine what
response is permitted by the Model Code, if any at all.
138. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2003).
139. Id. Canon 2 cmt. ("Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct by judges.").
140. Id.
141. Each state varies in the extent to which they adopt the Model Code. Some state codes
may be more restrictive than the Model Code, such as Pennsylvania, which specifically limits the
ability of judges to respond to unfair criticism of their record. Cooper, supra note 12, at 63.
20071
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Perhaps in response to the uncertainty many judges face when
deciding whether and how to respond to criticism, in 2003 the ABA
announced the appointment of a Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 142 The Commission was instructed to
review the Model Code and recommend revisions for possible
approval. 143 Recognizing the need for comprehensive revision "in light
of societal changes, as well as changes in the role of judges," the Com-
mission went to work to create a revised Model Code that would
improve and clarify the standards of conduct for judges serving through-
out the nation.'" The House of Delegates' approval of the revised
Model Code ("Revised Model Code") on February 12, 2007, marked the
completion of three and a half years of work. 1
45
About halfway through the Commission's work, the legal battle
over the life of Terri Schiavo seemed like it was slowly coming to an
end when the Schindlers' Motion for Emergency Stay was denied, clear-
ing the way for Terri's feeding tube to be removed pursuant to a 2000
court order.'4 6  After numerous legal attempts to block the feeding
tube's removal failed,' 47 Terri Schiavo died,'48 yet the onslaught of criti-
cism against the judiciary did not subside. 4 9 The timing of these events
surely made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Commission to ignore
the increasingly hostile attacks on the judiciary and the judges' per-
ceived inability to respond when drafting the Revised Model Code. To
be sure, the Commission's concern for this issue is evident in the
Revised Model Code itself. Despite efforts to preserve the existing
Model Code "to the maximum extent possible,"' 50 one glaring addition
142. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT preface (2003).
143. Id.
144. Harrison, supra note 114.
145. Id.
146. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at * 1-2 (Fla. 6th
Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2005); see also In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL
34546715, at *7 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000) (ordering removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding
tube).
147. See Kathy Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Schiavo Case Resources, Key Events in the
Case of Theresa Marie Schiavo, (2006), http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm
(describing the Schindlers and their advocates' myriad legal attempts to block the removal of Terri
Schiavo's feeding tube).
148. Terri Schiavo Has Died, CNN.coM, Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.comV2005/LAW/03/
3 1/schiavo/index.html.
149. See, e.g., Larry Lipman & Dara Kam, Republicans Renew Criticism of Judiciary's
Actions, PALM BEACH PosT, Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/state/
content/news/epaper/2005/04/01/a9aPOLITICAL_0401 .html.
150. Id. Indeed, though the Revised Model Code is different in form, it remains substantially
the same in substance. Whereas the Model Code consists of five canons followed by individual
sections and commentary, the Revised Model Code has only four canons followed by numbered
rules and comments. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003), with MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007).
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in the Revised Model Code is difficult to miss. Under Canon 2 of the
Revised Model Code (what was previously Canon 3 under the Model
Code), Rule 2.10 addresses Judicial Statements on Pending and Impend-
ing Cases. With language almost identical to that of Canon 3B(9) in the
Model Code, Rule 2.10(A) of the Revised Model Code instructs a judge
to refrain from making any public comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of any pending or
impending matter. 15' In an effort to clear up any confusion remaining
from Model Code, however, the Commission added a phrase that leaves
very little to interpretation. Unlike any statement in the Model Code,
Rule 2.10(E) of the Revised Model Code unequivocally states that "sub-
ject to the requirements of paragraph (A), a judge may respond directly
or through a third party to allegations in the media or elsewhere con-
cerning the judge's conduct in a matter."I2 The Reporter's Explanation
of Changes to Rule 2.10 explains the Commissioner's reasoning:
"Judges are justifiably reluctant to speak about pending cases. However,
the Commission wanted to make clear that when a judge's conduct is
called into question, the judge may respond as long as the response will
not affect the fairness of the proceeding." '153
Accordingly, under the Model Code a judge is not explicitly pro-
hibited from responding to public criticism so long as the response does
not violate any other provision of the Model Code. Whether a response
violates another provision in the Model Code is difficult to determine,
however, because Canons 1 and 2 imply that a judge's public response
to criticism may detract from the integrity of the court and create the
appearance of impropriety. In an effort to clarify the standards and
remove any confusion surrounding the propriety of a judge's response to
criticism, the Commission revised the Model Code to affirmatively grant
a judge permission to respond to criticism attacking his conduct, even in
a pending matter, so long as his comments are not reasonably expected
to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of the matter pending.'54
151. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10(A) (2007).
152. Id. R. 2.10(E) (emphasis supplied).
153. Id. R. 2.10 reporter's explanation of black letter n.3. The Reporter's Explanation of
Changes are printed after each rule in the Revised Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2007). These changes have been drafted by the Commission's reporters, based on the
record of the Commission, with the sole purpose of informing the ABA House of Delegates about
each proposed amendment to the Model Code, prior to the amendments' consideration. Id. They
have not been approved by the ABA Joint Commission and are not to be adopted as part of the
Model Code. Id.
154. Nevertheless, the new language found in the Revised Model Code will not govern judges'
conduct until it is adopted by the states. See Sholes, supra note 114, at 384-85 (explaining that
each updated version of the Model Code is "merely a set of suggestive guidelines and has no legal
significance unless jurisdictions statutorily enact or adopt it in the form of court rules").
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This is a significant addition to the ethical code governing judges and
undoubtedly reflects the Commission's grave concern for the welfare of
the judiciary after the events surrounding Terri Schiavo's death.
155
Even if a judge's extrajudicial response to criticism is not per se
unethical, those who insist that a judge should remain silent in the face
of an attack maintain that an extrajudicial response is inappropriate at
the very least. Thus, tradition, if not ethics, mandates that a judge not
indulge his critics with a response.15 6 Proponents of this argument are
primarily concerned with maintaining public respect for the judiciary as
a whole. 57  Specifically, any response to criticism - no matter how
unjust or unsubstantiated - both detracts from the dignity of the courts
158
and communicates to the public an "unwillingness to maintain the open-
ness of mind so essential for the proper performance of the judicial
role." ' 59  Therefore, by responding to criticism, judges could give the
appearance of being too concerned with public opinion or too defensive,
both of which will provoke more criticism. 6 o This reasoning resembles
the argument, made prior to the adoption of the Revised Model Code,
that judicial response to criticism violates Canons 1 and 2 of the Model
Code, which obligate a judge to uphold the integrity and independence
of the judiciary and avoid the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. 
1 61
A particularly well-known proponent of the "silence method" is
Judge Guido Calabresi of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, who gives one simple bit of advice to federal judges who find
themselves the target of a firestorm of criticism: "[Do] absolutely noth-
155. Still, despite the Commission's clear statement of dissatisfaction with the recent attacks
on the judiciary, they nevertheless remain hesitant to grant the judiciary the unrestrained freedom
to respond to the media whenever they so choose. Instead, the Commission instructs in Comment
I to Rule 2.10 that depending on the circumstances, a judge should consider whether it is
preferable for a third party to respond to the criticism, as opposed to the judge himself. Id. R. 2. 10
cmt. 1. The Reporter's Explanations of Changes explains that this suggestion reflects the
Commission's "preference for keeping to a minimum the extent to which judges discuss cases
directly with the media." Id. R. 2.10 reporter's explanation of comments.
156. See, e.g., Blatz, supra note 3, at 26-27 ("[T]he judiciary has a long tradition of refraining
from political discourse because of our adjudicative role in the resolution of individual cases.
And, this tradition of restraint has not equipped us to wade into the powerful currents of the
information age.").
157. See, e.g., id.
158. See Miner, supra note 85, at 80. This sentiment is reflected in the words of one legal
scholar: "If the criticism is scurrilous, the criticism does not deserve the dignity of a judicial
reply." Ross, supra note 134, at 606; see also Cooper, supra note 12, at 64 ("When judges come
to their own defense, they are accused of self-interest, and are demeaned by the necessity of
entering a public forum to defend a position.").
159. See Miner, supra note 85, at 32.
160. Cynthia Jacob, Judges Are Lawyers Too, 183 N.J. LAW. 4, 4 (1997).
161. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-2 (2003).
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ing; silence is the price of life tenure."' 6 2 Doing nothing in the face of
an attack can take its toll on a judge, however, and occasionally a mem-
ber of the judiciary decides that it just is not worth it. When Judge
Sarokin, a federal Court of Appeals judge, found himself on the receiv-
ing end of a barrage of unjust criticism and accusations, he wrote a letter
to then-President Clinton, advising him of his resignation. 63 Recogniz-
ing that the criticism was beginning to take a deleterious effect on his
ability to remain impartial and unaffected by public opinion, Judge
Sarokin explained to President Clinton:
It is apparent that there are those who have decided to "Willie
Hortonize" the federal judiciary, and that I am to be one of their
prime targets.... So long as I was the focus of criticism for my own
opinions, I was designed to take the abuse no matter how unfair or
untrue, but the first moment I considered whether or how an opinion I
was preparing would be used was the moment I decided that I could
no longer serve as a federal judge.'
64
THE OPPOSITE STRATEGY: SELF-DEFENSE
While silence has been the most traditional response to criticism
directed toward the judiciary, many argue that silence is just that: a tra-
dition. 65 Specifically, even before the adoption of the Revised Model
Code in early 2007, the argument was made that a judge is ethically
permitted, perhaps even obligated, to respond to criticism directed
toward him individually or the judiciary as a whole.
166
Advocates of the "self-defense strategy" typically begin by pointing
out that, despite assertions to the contrary, the Model Code was never
intended to limit a judge's ability to respond to critics and defend one-
self when verbally attacked. 167 In fact, as previously discussed, with the
exception of Canon 3B(9), which prohibits a judge from commenting on
pending cases under certain circumstances, nothing in the Model Code
explicitly prohibits a judge from responding to criticism. 168 Thus, the
162. Hawkins, supra note 16, at 1354 (citation omitted).
163. Letter from H. Lee Sarokin, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to
President William Jefferson Clinton (June 4, 1996), available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/
legaldocs/misc/sarokin.html.
164. Id.
165. Fortunato, supra note 48, at 679 (explaining that conventional wisdom and prevalent
practice dictate that "the men and women who make up the nation's federal and state courts are
obligated to remain silent and on the sidelines of any struggle to preserve their individual integrity
or that of the judicial branch of government").
166. Id.
167. Id. The Commission's subsequent actions when drafting the Revised Model Code, i.e.,
granting the judiciary express permission to respond to criticism, certainly bolsters this argument.
168. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003).
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conventional method of responding to criticism - doing nothing at all -
may merely be a self-imposed restriction, "a tired custom and usage that
at this point in our history does nothing to protect and preserve the inde-
pendence of the judiciary." 169
If responding to criticism is not proscribed by ethical rules, the
question then becomes: is it in the best interest of the judiciary to do so?
While some argue that responding to criticism compromises the dignity
of the court, others counter that providing a judge with an opportunity to
respond to criticism would, in fact, result in just the opposite. 7 ° When
the court renders controversial decisions that may be contrary to the sen-
timents of the majority, the judiciary needs public confidence in its
integrity and impartiality more than ever. 17 1 To merit that confidence,
judges must take an active role in defending themselves and rebut the
often baseless claims and accusations of their critics. 172 By remaining
silent in the face of an attack on a judge's integrity or the judiciary as a
whole, the judge is conveying a sense of defeat to the often uninformed
public. 173 By speaking out, however, a judge's response can serve as a
valuable tool to inform and elevate the public discourse regarding cur-
rent issues and the judiciary as an institution.
174
Furthermore, by responding to their critics, judges can help dispel
the popular notion that the judiciary, occupying what some view as "the
most secretive of the three branches of the federal government," 175 is
"an aristocracy, above the fray and unaccountable."1 76 Indeed, indulg-
ing the common sentiment that judges occupy a superhuman status
would be contrary to the Model Code's commentary explaining that
"'[c]omplete separation of a judge from extra-judicial activities is
neither possible or wise; a judge should not become isolated from the
community in which the judge lives.' ,
177
169. Fortunato, supra note 48, at 684.
170. Id. at 687.
171. See Kelson, supra note 54, at 15 ("In order to do its job properly, the judiciary must have
the public's moral authority. Without it, the courts will not have the support of the legislature or
executive which enforces its judgments and grants it resources to operate.").
172. Fortunato, supra note 48, at 687-88. It becomes even more important to counter criticism
that is part of a political ploy to advance the critics' "misguided objective of having judicial
decisions conform to majoritarian preferences." Id. at 688.
173. Id. at 687.
174. Id.
175. Thomas Penfield Jackson, Don't Gag the Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 58,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=1032128635760 (explaining that
although courts' decisionmaking reasoning is typically available to the public, the most important
decisions are made behind closed doors).
176. Fortunato, supra note 48, at 701.
177. Brown, supra note 21, at 13 (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
The past two years have seen a dangerous resurgence of attacks on
the judiciary that threaten the very foundation of our democratic govern-
ment. Without a doubt, the tragedy that befell Terri Schiavo and her
family touched the hearts of many and forced us to question our values
and beliefs. While Terri Schiavo's story may have raised a seemingly
novel and controversial issue to the public consciousness for the first
time, it also dealt with an issue as old as the Constitution itself, placing
our judiciary in the midst of a war that has been raging since the found-
ing of this country. This war is far from over, and our judiciary will
surely continue to face unjust criticism, threats, and intimidation long
into the future. Then, as now, the good men and women of our courts
will be forced to choose how they will respond to the type of criticism
that threatens the independence of the judiciary and erodes public confi-
dence in our courts.
In an ideal situation, a judge would have the opportunity to respond
to critics by crafting a well-reasoned and illuminative argument in the
opinion itself, as Judge Birch did in his concurring opinion in the Schi-
avo case. In the more likely situation that a judge will not have the
opportunity to respond to his critics within a legal opinion, he can either
remain silent or defend himself by responding extrajudicially. While
both options have advantages and disadvantages, it has been the long-
standing tradition of the bench to remain silent and leave its defense to
others, such as the organized bar. This may change however, as the
Revised Model Code now provides judges with explicit permission to
respond to critics even if the conduct at issue relates to a matter cur-
rently pending before a court, so long as the response will not affect the
fairness of the proceeding. On the other hand, even if many or all of the
states adopt the permissive language of the Revised Model Code, the
judiciary may nevertheless adhere to tradition and maintain the conven-
tional practice of remaining silent, even when criticism is unwarranted
and unjust. Although it is too early to tell whether the judiciary will
embrace its newly articulated freedom, its very existence is a clear indi-
cation that the hostile and antagonistic criticism that has become so
common in recent years will no longer be tolerated. Now, more than
ever, those who have become accustomed to freely criticizing the judici-
ary without fear of being held accountable by a judge's response should
think twice. The time has come when the judiciary just might fight
back.
2007]
